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Forecasting Inflation
and Growth: Do Private
Forecasts Match Those
of Policymakers? 
William T. Gavin and Rachel J. Mandal
G
enerally, we value forecasts for their accu-
racy. In some cases, however, the forecasts
themselves are interesting because of
what they reveal about the forecaster. Monetary
policymaker forecasts are important because they
partially reveal what policymakers believe will fol-
low from their decisions. 
Forecasts of inflation and real output (whether
made by Federal Reserve officials or private sector
economists) contain information that is important
for changing the stance of monetary policy. Market
participants generally believe that Fed policymakers
will change their policy stance if the economy
appears to be headed in a different direction from
what was expected at the time policy was adopted.
Svensson (1997) and Svensson and Woodford (2000)
explain why a central bank might want to target its
inflation forecast. The intuition in their explanation
is that policymakers should look at everything that
is relevant when deciding to change the policy
stance. The trouble with looking at everything is
that there is so much information to process, one
needs an organizing framework such as a fore-
casting model. Forecasting models are developed
to monitor incoming information and to weigh
each piece appropriately. Forecasting models
range from the very largest, with over a thousand
equations, to small models that are no more than
simple rules of thumb. Whether using a large
econometric model or a simple rule of thumb,
forecasters rarely use the values that come directly
from the model. Rather, they typically make judg-
mental adjustments before reporting the forecasts. 
In this article, we examine the role of forecasts
in the monetary policy process. Our focus is on
the forecasts of inflation and economic growth,
the main policy objectives. Economic forecasts are
important because they reflect incoming informa-
tion about the current state of the economy,
including the forecasters’ beliefs about monetary
policy objectives. In the United States, there are no
explicit numerical objectives for output and infla-
tion. Thus, policymaker forecasts are particularly
interesting because they may reveal information
about long-run policy goals. 
Fed forecasts, unfortunately, are not readily
available to the public. We show that the Blue Chip
consensus forecasts, made by a group of private
economists, are a good stand-in for the policy-
makers’ forecasts. This is important because the
policymakers in the Federal Reserve, the members
of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC),
reveal their forecasts only sparingly and after policy
decisions are made. First, we show how well the
forecasts match. We find that the forecasts of eco-
nomic growth are very similar and appear to be
about equal on average. The result for inflation
forecasts is more interesting. Here we see that the
private sector economists generally predicted
higher inflation than did Fed policymakers,
especially in the 1980s. The Blue Chip economists
did not believe that the FOMC would achieve and
maintain such a low inflation rate in the 1980s.
Since 1995, the forecasts have converged. Evi-
dently, the FOMC has achieved some credibility
with the Blue Chip economists. 
When researchers want to know the history of
policymakers’ forecasts, they typically go to the
Fed’s briefing documents to extract the forecasts
of the research staff at the Board of Governors. We
show that the Blue Chip forecasts for output are as
good a proxy for Fed policymakers’ views as are
the research staff forecasts. In the case of inflation,
the results vary with the time horizon. Generally,
the Blue Chip consensus forecasts for inflation
match the policymakers’ forecasts at shorter hori-
zons while the research staff forecasts are closer at
the longest horizon. 
Finally, we examine the use of alternative fore-
casts in a version of the Taylor rule, a popular
characterization of monetary policy actions. It is
popular because it is a simple summary of a com-
plicated policy process. It is expressed as: 
(1) ,
where FFt
A is the federal funds rate target chosen
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by the FOMC, re is the long-run equilibrium real
interest rate (assumed by Taylor to be equal to 2
percent per year), pt–1 is the average inflation rate
observed over the previous four quarters, pT is the
inflation target (which Taylor assumed to be equal
to 2 percent per year), yt–1 is last period’s real
gross domestic product (GDP) measured in
logarithms, and yt
F
–1 is last period’s potential real
GDP measured in logarithms. The term in the
bracket, (yt–1–yt
F
–1), is approximately equal to the
percentage deviation of GDP from the perceived
level of potential GDP.
This backward-looking rule prescribes settings
for the federal funds rate, the Fed’s short-term
policy instrument, according to the deviation of
the past year’s inflation from a 2 percent target
and the deviation of last period’s GDP from a mea-
sure of potential GDP. We begin by showing that
historical analysis of the Taylor rule should use
real-time data; that is, data that were available
when the federal funds rate target was being set.
We show that the forward-looking rule based on
policymaker forecasts is virtually identical to one
based on Blue Chip consensus forecasts. Neither
does quite as well as the backward-looking rule
using real-time data; however, all three versions of
the Taylor rule do much better at explaining
historical movement in the federal funds rate than
do rules based on the current revised data.
Because purely forward-looking rules may be
inherently unstable, we also examine a combina-
tion rule that includes both lagged values of
inflation and the output gap using real-time data
and the Blue Chip forecasts of the current-year
inflation and output gap.1 This rule with both
backward- and forward-looking elements matches
the actual federal funds rate slightly better than
the rule based on real-time data.
FOMC AND BLUE CHIP FORECASTS
FOMC members prepare forecasts for Congres-
sional testimony twice a year.2 This testimony was
mandated by the Full Employment and Balanced
Growth Act of 1978. Section 108 of this act explic-
itly required the Fed to submit “written reports
setting forth (1) a review and analysis of recent
developments affecting economic trends in the
nation; (2) the objectives and plans … with respect
to the monetary and credit aggregates …; and (3)
the relationship of the aforesaid objectives and
plans to the short-term goals set forth in the most
recent Economic Report of the President …”  In
order to satisfy the third item, the Federal Reserve
Chairman began reporting a summary of Fed policy-
makers’ forecasts to Congress in July 1979. Since
then, similar summaries of forecasts have been
reported every February and July.3 Forecasts are
made of annual, fourth-quarter-over-fourth-
quarter growth rates for nominal GDP, real GDP,
and inflation.4 Fed policymakers also forecast the
average level of unemployment for the fourth
quarter of the year. In February, the forecasts per-
tain to the current calendar year (referred to below
as the 12-month-ahead forecast). In July, forecasts
are updated for the current calendar year (6-month-
ahead forecasts) and preliminary projections are
made for the next calendar year (18-month-ahead
forecasts). 
We focus on the forecasts of real output growth
and inflation because they best capture monetary
policy objectives. We use the output price deflator
as the measure of inflation primarily because it
has been consistently forecasted throughout the
entire period. Even when the Fed was reporting
the forecast for inflation based on the consumer
price index (from 1989 through 1999), there was
also a forecast for both nominal and real output,
so there was always an implied forecast for the
output deflator. 
Individual Federal Reserve officials submit
their economic forecasts based on their judgment
about the appropriate policy to be followed over
the coming year. These individual projections may
be revised after the FOMC adopts a specific policy.
The revised projections are then reported as a
range, listing the high and low values for each item,
and as a central tendency that omits extreme fore-
casts and is meant to be a better representation of
1 See Woodford (2000) for a summary of the argument that purely
forward-looking rules may lead to instability.
2 The FOMC is the policymaking committee of the Federal Reserve
System. When the Board is full, the Committee consists of the 7
governors of the Board, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, and 4 of the remaining 11 Federal Reserve Bank presi-
dents who serve on a rotating basis. All 12 presidents attend every
meeting, contribute to the discussion, and provide forecasts that
are summarized in testimony to the Congress. The Green Book is a
briefing document with macroeconomic forecasts prepared by staff
economists at the Board of Governors about three workdays before
each FOMC meeting.
3 This reporting requirement has now expired, but the Fed provided
forecasts to Congress on July 20, 2000, and February 13, 2001.
These data are not included in this study.
4 The Fed switched from GNP to GDP in 1992.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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the consensus view. In this article, we define the
consensus FOMC forecast as the midpoint of this
central tendency range.
The Blue Chip consensus forecasts are taken
from the February and July reports. These forecasts
are collected on the first three working days of the
month, and the information available to private
sector economists is approximately the same as
the information available to the FOMC members
when they make their forecasts. Most importantly,
both groups usually had the latest information on
the price indexes from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics and the most recent report on actual GDP
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Figure 1 is a scatter diagram with triangles
showing the relation between the consensus GDP
growth forecasts made by the FOMC between
1983 and 1994 and those made by the Blue Chip
economists during the same period. We start in
1983 because that is when the Federal Reserve
first began to report the central tendency of the
forecasts. It was also the first year that they
reported forecasts for all the participants: FOMC
members and nonvoting Federal Reserve Bank
presidents.5
If the FOMC and Blue Chip forecasts were
exactly the same, they would lie on the 45-degree
line shown. As Figure 1 shows, the forecasts were
quite similar and seem to be distributed evenly
above and below the 45-degree line. That is, there
does not seem to be any tendency for the Blue
Chip economists to systematically forecast more
or less output growth than the FOMC.
The same cannot be said of the inflation fore-
casts. The triangles in Figure 2, where most of the
points lie above the 45-degree line, show that the
Blue Chip economists usually forecasted higher
inflation than did the FOMC. The period from
1983 to the present has been a period of moderate
and falling inflation. Throughout, the Federal
Reserve has had a goal of eliminating inflation. In
general, the FOMC’s forecasts of inflation have
been lower than the Blue Chip forecasts. However,
as inflation became lower in the 1990s, the
forecasts have converged, indicating that the
private sector has gained confidence in the Fed’s
ability to deliver low inflation. So, although the
Blue Chip inflation forecasts have not always been
unbiased indicators of the FOMC’s inflation
forecasts, they have been better in recent years.
GREEN BOOK FORECASTS
The Green Book forecast is put together by a
large staff of economists at the Board of Governors
in Washington, D.C. It is prepared for the FOMC
members who read it in advance of the meetings
5 In July 1979, the Fed reported a range of Board member forecasts
(governors only). From 1980 through 1982, the Fed reported a
range of forecasts for FOMC members. 
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and receive an oral presentation of this forecast at
the meeting. These forecasts are only available to
the public five years after they are made. 
Romer and Romer (2000) compare the Green
Book forecasts with private sector forecasts using
quarterly data from 1965 through 1991 and fore-
casts over several horizons (usually from forecasts
of the current quarter out to seven quarters ahead).
They present convincing evidence that the Green
Book inflation forecasts have been more accurate
than the private forecasts, including the Blue Chip
consensus (for the period from 1980 to 1991).
They also report that the Green Book forecasts of
output were better than private sector forecasts,
but the evidence for output forecasts is weaker.
The Green Book forecasts from 1983 through
1994 are depicted as circles in Figures 1 and 2.
Casual observation suggests that the Green Book
forecasts and the Blue Chip consensus represent
the policymakers’ consensus equally well. These
scatter diagrams combine forecasts across the
three horizons of 6, 12, and 18 months ahead. 
Table 1 gives more detailed information about
how well the Blue Chip consensus and the Green
Book forecast match the FOMC consensus. Results
are reported for the combined forecasts (combined
over the three forecasting horizons) and for the
three separate horizons. The forecast error in
Table 1 is defined as the difference between the
alternative forecast (Blue Chip consensus or Green
Book) and the midpoint of the FOMC central
tendency forecast. We report root-mean-squared
errors (RMSE) for both inflation and output
forecasts. 
The results are interesting. On average, the dif-
ferences in errors between the Green Book and
Blue Chip are larger for the real output forecasts
than they are for the inflation forecasts. For both
real output and inflation, the Blue Chip consensus
is closer to the FOMC forecast than is the Green
Book. For the first 12 years after the FOMC began
reporting the central tendency, the Blue Chip fore-
cast has provided a good measure of the FOMC’s
view of the future, as least as good as one would
get by knowing the Green Book forecast.
RELATIVE ACCURACY
1983 Through 1994 
Table 2 reports the relative accuracy of real
output forecasts to the real-time data from 1983
through 1994. For the separate and combined
horizons, we compare the individual forecasts to
the value that was first reported by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis.6 The Blue Chip forecasts are
best (lowest RMSE) for the 12- and 18-month
horizons. The FOMC’s forecasts have the lowest
RMSE at the 6-month horizon. In none of these
cases are the Green Book forecasts of real output
best.7
The Green Book fares better, however, for
inflation forecasts from 1983 through 1994, as
shown in Table 3. Earlier, we saw that the Blue
Chip inflation forecasts were generally above the
FOMC’s forecasts in the 1980s. Here we see that all
three forecasts, on average, predicted higher than
actual inflation, with the FOMC forecasts sand-
wiched between the Blue Chip forecasts on the
6 We used the vintage data sets from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia described in Croushore and Stark (1999). 
7 This is surprising given the conclusions in Romer and Romer (2000).
They examined an earlier and longer sample with more frequent
forecasts over more horizons. We examine only those dates and
forecast horizons for which the central tendency of FOMC members’
forecasts were reported to Congress. 
Blue Chip Versus Green Book as a Proxy for FOMC Forecasts (1983 to 1994)
RMSE of output forecast RMSE of inflation forecast
Blue Chip Green Book Blue Chip  Green Book
All 3 horizons  0.22  0.36 0.32  0.38
6-Month horizon 0.17  0.35 0.21  0.25
12-Month horizon 0.25  0.32 0.32  0.38
18-Month horizon 0.24  0.40 0.40  0.47
NOTE: Bold typeface indicates a better proxy for the midpoint of the FOMC tendency.
Table 1FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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high end and the more accurate Green Book fore-
casts on the low end.
1995 Through 1999
Table 4 examines the accuracy of the Blue
Chip and FOMC real output forecasts from 1995
through 1999. Again, we report results based on
the combined data sets and also separately for
each forecast horizon. For these five years, both
the Blue Chip and the FOMC policymakers’ fore-
casts for real output growth were about 1 percent
below actual. The large bias in the mean error
reflects the ongoing surprise about the strength of
economic growth and upward revisions to
estimates of the underlying trend. We find that in
the last five years, on average, the FOMC has been
more accurate, as measured by the RMSE, than the
Blue Chip at all forecast horizons.
We saw in Figure 2 that the FOMC and Blue
Chip forecasts converged as inflation came down
in the 1990s. Table 5 looks at the accuracy of the
Blue Chip and FOMC inflation forecasts over the
last five years of the sample. Both the FOMC and
Blue Chip forecasts predicted higher than actual
inflation from 1995 through 1999. The FOMC
inflation forecasts have been slightly more
accurate than the Blue Chip forecast for all three
forecast horizons. 
Although the FOMC forecasts were more accu-
rate than the Blue Chip forecasts, the forecasts
were not far apart. On average for all three horizons,
the Blue Chip consensus for GDP growth was a
tenth of a percentage point below the FOMC’s, and
the Blue Chip consensus for inflation was one-
tenth higher than the FOMC’s. The five years
reported in Tables 4 and 5, 1995 through 1999,
have been characterized by surprisingly high real
GDP growth and surprisingly low inflation, as is
seen by the negative mean errors for output growth
and the positive mean errors for inflation.
USING FORECASTS IN TAYLOR-TYPE
RULES
In this section we use a simple policymaking
framework to see whether the differences between
the Blue Chip and FOMC forecasts are economically
Table 2
Accuracy of Output Forecasts (1983 to 1994)
Mean error RMSE
Blue Chip FOMC members Green Book Blue Chip FOMC members Green Book
All 3 horizons  0.04  0.06 –0.06 0.94 0.96 1.05
6-Month horizon 0.02 0.05  –0.02 0.76  0.74 0.80
12-Month horizon –0.11  –0.08 –0.15 1.05 1.11 1.23
18-Month horizon 0.22  0.22  –0.02 0.99 1.00 1.06
NOTE: Best forecast indicated by bold typeface.
Table 3
Accuracy of Inflation Forecasts (1983 to 1994)
Mean error RMSE
Blue Chip FOMC members Green Book Blue Chip FOMC members Green Book
All 3 horizons  0.69  0.46  0.35 0.92 0.80 0.65
6-Month horizon 0.45 0.33  0.21 0.64 0.55 0.36
12-Month horizon 0.60  0.41  0.26 0.79 0.74 0.61
18-Month horizon 1.01  0.65  0.57 1.23 1.05 0.88
NOTE: Best forecast indicated by bold typeface.16 MAY/JUNE 2001
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significant. Taylor (1993) proposed characterizing
past Fed policy as if it were made according to a
formula similar to equation (1), which has come to
be known as the Taylor rule.8
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) show that a
rule of this form can be derived as an optimal
policy under certain conditions. Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (1999) show that a rule of this type can be
optimal in a dynamic, forward-looking IS/LM
model in which the central bank’s loss function is
quadratic in deviations of inflation from target and
output from potential. Even if the central bank
cares only about the inflation objective, the nom-
inal interest rate target may be set as a function of
the state of the economy. If the real interest rate is
procyclical, adjusting the federal funds rate target
for changes in the gap between potential and
actual GDP may be a method for taking into
account the cyclical deviation of the real interest
rate from the long-run equilibrium value.9
While clearly not advocating that any central
bank follow any such simple rule slavishly, Taylor
recommended his rule as a reference point in
debates about whether a policy change might be
needed. Indeed, that has happened as many
central banks now regularly monitor variations of
the original Taylor rule. Figure 3 shows the quarterly
average federal funds rate and our calculation of
the federal funds rate target implied by the Taylor
rule for the period from 1983 to 1999. 
We begin by showing the federal funds rate
target implied by equation (1).10 As Figure 3 shows,
the rule does not do particularly well during the
periods before 1990 or after 1994. Table 6 shows
that the federal funds rate target, predicted by
using current revised data, is, on average, 166 basis
points below the actual federal funds rate.
8 In his 1993 paper, Taylor used current year values for the GDP gap
and inflation. Since current year data are unknown at the time poli-
cy is made, we have used lagged values.
9 For recent evidence suggesting that the real interest rate is procycli-
cal, see Dotsey and Scholl (2000).
10 Note that the usefulness of the Taylor rule has been questioned by
many researchers, including recent articles by Hetzel (2000), Kozicki
(1999), McCallum (1999), and Orphanides (1998).
Table 4
Accuracy of Output Forecasts (1995 to 1999)
Mean error RMSE
Blue Chip FOMC members Green Book Blue Chip FOMC members Green Book
All 3 horizons  –1.13  –1.02 NA 1.46 1.35 NA
6-Month horizon –0.52 –0.53 NA 0.81 0.73  NA
12-Month horizon –1.26 –1.01 NA 1.67 1.50 NA
18-Month horizon –1.73 –1.65 NA 1.78  1.71  NA
NOTE: Best forecast indicated by bold typeface.
Table 5
Accuracy of Inflation Forecasts (1995 to 1999)
Mean error RMSE
Blue Chip FOMC members Green Book Blue Chip FOMC members Green Book
All 3 horizons  0.59  0.48 NA 0.72 0.64 NA
6-Month horizon 0.36 0.29 NA 0.43 0.39  NA
12-Month horizon 0.52 0.37 NA 0.64 0.50 NA
18-Month horizon 0.98 0.86 NA 1.03  0.96  NA
NOTE: Best forecast indicated by bold typeface.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
MAY/JUNE 2001      17
Figure 3 also includes the Taylor rule for the
federal funds rate target using real-time data for
GDP and inflation and a forecast for potential GDP
from a recursive model that fits a quadratic time
trend to the real-time data. As the figure shows,
there is an important difference in the target
calculated for the federal funds rate when we use
the real-time data. Contrary to the case using cur-
rently available revised data, the real-time Taylor
rule generally lies above the actual federal funds
rate. The right-most column in Table 6 shows that
the average deviation was 34 basis points. These
results show that ex post policy rules based on
revised data may do a poor job of replicating
actual policy choices.  
Figure 4 includes two versions of a forward-
looking Taylor rule where we modify Taylor’s
general specification by replacing the backward-
looking measures of inflation and output with
FOMC and Blue Chip forecasts for the calendar
year. The modified Taylor rule used is 
(2) ,
where pt
e is the forecast of fourth-quarter-over-
fourth-quarter inflation for the current year and
(yt
e–yt
F) is the output gap expected for the current
year. We use the real-time data and our quadratic
time trend to predict potential GDP in the fourth
quarter of each year. We construct a fourth-
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quarter forecast of the level of GDP using the
actual real-time value of the previous fourth-
quarter level of GDP and the fourth-quarter-over-
fourth-quarter forecast of GDP for the current year.
Whether we use forecasts from the FOMC or Blue
Chip, the implications for the federal funds rate
target are almost identical. 
In Table 6, the RMSE between the actual
federal funds rate and the target predicted by the
alternative Taylor rules are given along a diagonal
in parentheses. For this period, using these fore-
casts, the backward-looking rule using real-time
data predicts the actual federal funds rate slightly
more accurately than do the forward-looking rules.
The forward-looking version using the Blue Chip
consensus forecasts is more accurate than the
version using FOMC forecasts. However, the mean
error for the FOMC version is closest to zero. As we
saw in Figure 4, the Blue Chip and FOMC versions
of the Taylor rule seem to move in tandem. The
correlation between these versions of the Taylor
rule is 0.99. 
Bernanke and Woodford (1997) have argued
that purely forward-looking Taylor rules may not
be practical. Chari (1997) explains simply, 
Suppose, for instance, that the central bank
wants to stabilize inflation rates and private
forecasters have information that is not
available to the central bank about future
Figure 3
Taylor Rules: Current Versus Real-Time Data       
Taylor Rule with  
Current Vintage Data  
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Taylor Rules: Blue Chip Versus FOMC           
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inflation. The central bank could use pri-
vate forecasts of inflation to choose its
policy instrument. The problem is that if
the central bank is completely effective in
using its policy instrument to stabilize in-
flation, private forecasts of inflation should
rationally be the central bank’s inflation
target in which case, private forecasts pro-
vide no information about inflation! This
paradox arises because market forecasts
of a goal variable depend upon the central
bank’s policy rule and if the central bank
used the information well, market fore-
casts will not be informative. (p. 685)
Woodford (2000) recommends policies that
include both backward- and forward-looking
elements. We create a combination rule that uses
both the lagged values of inflation and the output
gap as well as the Blue Chip forecasts for the cur-
rent year. It is equivalent to taking an average of the
real-time Taylor rule (FFt
A) and the forward-looking
rule using Blue Chip forecasts (FFt
B). The results for
this combination rule are given in the bottom row
of Table 6. The federal funds rate target that comes
out of this rule has the highest correlation with
the actual federal funds rate (0.88) and the lowest
RMSE (1.02) of all the rules that we considered. 
CONCLUSION
We have found that the Blue Chip consensus
appears to have been closely matched to the mid-
point of the FOMC’s central tendency forecasts.
During the period from the beginning of 1983
through the summer of 1994, the Blue Chip
forecasts for output were not only more closely
related to the FOMC’s output forecasts, but they
were slightly more accurate than the forecasts in
the Green Book. The Green Book forecasts of infla-
tion were much more accurate than were the Blue
Chip’s during the period between 1983 and 1994.
Nevertheless, the Blue Chip forecasts were still as
closely related to the FOMC forecasts as were the
Green Book forecasts. 
In the period since 1994, the FOMC consen-
sus has been more accurate than the Blue Chip
consensus for both inflation and output, but not
by much. During the period from 1995 through
1999, inflation has been lower than expectations
while the real economy has been unexpectedly
strong. 
For the entire period, the differences between
the Blue Chip consensus forecasts and the mid-
point of the central tendency are not statistically
or economically relevant for the policymaking
process, at least not as that process has been
characterized by Taylor (1993). We should not be
surprised to learn that the Blue Chip forecasts of
inflation and output are highly correlated with
FOMC forecasts. Both the FOMC members and
the economists who contribute to the Blue Chip
consensus observe the same statistical releases
and use similar economic theories to interpret
the data. 
Alternative Versions of the Taylor Rule
Actual Current  FOMC  Combination: 
federal  revised  Real-time  Blue Chip  members’ real time and  Mean 
funds rate data data forecast forecasts Blue Chip error
Current revised data  0.73  (1.42) –1.66
Real-time data 0.87 0.82  (1.04) 0.34
Blue Chip forecast 0.84 0.67 0.92 (1.16) 0.15
FOMC members’ 0.82 0.67 0.91 0.99  (1.23) –0.03
forecasts 
Combination: real time  0.88 0.76 0.98 0.98 0.97  (1.02) 0.24
and Blue Chip 
NOTE: Correlations among the alternative predictions of the Taylor rule and the actual federal funds rate are shown in bold. RMSE
are shown in parentheses (Taylor rule minus actual federal funds rate). Right column shows the mean error for each version of the
Taylor rule.
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